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Abstract
The main role of the external auditor in the classical corporate governance 
scheme is to verify the accounting information provided by the firms’ managers. 
Lengthy audit engagements are viewed as a main threat to preserve auditor 
independence, and therefore regulators have established mandatory rotation 
rules in many countries worldwide. Researchers, however, have addressed the 
analysis of audit independence mainly by evaluating the role of the auditor not 
as an accounting verifier but as a substitute of bankruptcy prediction models. 
Our results show that the likelihood of audit qualifications decreases with audit 
tenure. This result is robust to the inclusion in the model of a proxy of accounting 
quality. Therefore, the potential explanation for this finding based on higher 
accounting quality associated to lengthy audit engagements is rejected. This 
threat to the independence of the external auditor has not been considered in 
the mandatory rotation rules established in most countries that only requires 
the rotation of the audit partner.
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Resumen
La principal función del auditor externo en el esquema de gobierno corporativo 
clásico es el de verificar la información contable proporcionada por los gerentes 
de las empresas. Las relaciones largas de auditoría se consideran una amenaza 
importante para preservar la independencia del auditor. En consecuencia, los 
reguladores han establecido normas de rotación obligatoria en muchos países 
del mundo. Los investigadores, sin embargo, han abordado el análisis de la 
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independencia del auditor, principalmente mediante la evaluación de su fun-
ción no como un verificador de la contabilidad de la empresa, sino como un 
sustituto de los modelos de predicción de quiebra. Nuestros resultados muestran 
que la probabilidad recibir informes de auditoría con salvedades disminuye en 
función del número de años que el auditor lleva auditando a la empresa. Este 
resultado es robusto a la inclusión en el modelo de una proxy de la calidad de 
la contabilidad. Por lo tanto, se rechaza la posible explicación de este resulta-
do a partir de la mayor calidad de la contabilidad que se logra en relaciones 
largas de auditoría. Esta amenaza a la independencia del auditor externo no 
ha sido considerada en las reglas de rotación obligatoria establecidas en la 
mayoría de los países que solo requieren la rotación del socio pero no de la 
firma de auditoría.
Palabras clave: Independencia del auditor, salvedades, duración de la relación 
de auditoría, calidad de la auditoría.
Clasificación JEL: G38, L15, M4.
1. Introduction
Research about the quality of financial statements has increased dramatically 
over the last years. Several factors can explain this fact, among them, the grow-
ing importance of corporate governance matters, particularly after the dot-com 
bubble and more recently the contemporaneous financial crisis. The prolifera-
tion of corporate scandals as Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and Lemahn Brothers 
have posed serious concerns about the reliability of financial statements, since 
in none of these cases they showed the real situation of the firm.
The external auditor is the key figure to guarantee the quality of financial 
statements, and thus its role is crucial in the corporate governance scheme. 
When these statements have an unqualified opinion, participants in the financial 
markets assume that they reflect the current situation of the firm. Nevertheless, 
the external auditor faces potential conflict of interests regarding the relationship 
with the audited company that may undermine its credibility when judging its 
clients’ financial statements. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed largely as a reac-
tion to corporate financial scandals of the dot-com era, attempted to improve the 
quality of financial statements for public companies in the U.S., with provisions 
to strengthen auditor independence. Similarly, corporate governance codes ap-
proved in numerous countries worldwide have included recommendations to 
guarantee auditor independence.
The length of the auditor-client relationship constitutes a major issue in 
the auditor conflict of interest, because long auditor-client relationships may 
cause auditor complacency about management decisions regarding the firm’s 
financial statements. Following this view, the mandatory rotation of the external 
auditor has long been suggested as a mean to improve auditor independence. 
With this aim, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required a study about the potential ef-
fects of imposing the mandatory rotation of auditors. Although the results of 
the study did not support that auditor rotation increased the quality of financial 
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reports, and therefore, it did not recommend mandatory rotation, regulators 
finally established that the lead audit partner and the concurring partner could 
not perform audit services for the same client for more than five consecutive 
fiscal years. In addition, they also require a minimum five-year time-out period 
before a partner may return to audit a client. Similarly to the situation in the 
U.S., the mandatory rotation of the audit partner is nowadays required in many 
countries. By the year 2008, the 27 States Members of the European Union 
(E.U.) were required to adapt national law systems to the revised 8th Directive. 
One important feature of this Directive was to establish audit partner rotation. 
Nevertheless, each State Member can voluntarily establish the maximum length 
of the auditor-client relationship. Countries within the E.U. have established 
different periods: five years in the United Kingdom, six years in France and 
seven in Germany and Spain. While many countries require the rotation of the 
lead audit partner, only a few ones have enforced a mandatory rotation rule for 
the audit company. In Italy, periodical rotation of auditing firms was established 
in 1974 for public companies, which cannot be audited by the same company 
for more than nine years. In addition, a minimum lag of three years is required 
before the previous auditor can be reappointed. Similarly, listed companies in 
Brazil and South Korea are required to rotate their independent auditor firm 
every five and six years respectively. In Austria, Canada and Spain, a mandatory 
company rotation rule was enforced but subsequently abandoned.
Previous research has addressed the relationship between audit tenure and 
the nature of the audit report by focusing on audit qualifications for reasons 
of going concern and analyzing financially distressed companies [Menon and 
Schwartz, 1985; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Vanstraelen, 2000; Vanstraelen, 
2002; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Knechel and 
Vanstraelen, 2007; Lim and Tan, 2010; Gul et al., 2011]. Such approach faces 
some advantages and disadvantages. Among the former, it can be posed that the 
universe examined is relatively homogenous, and that qualifications for reasons 
of going concern are particularly meaningful for investors and policy makers. 
Nevertheless, financially distressed firms represent just a very small share of 
the total population of audited firms and the same situation occurs regarding 
audit qualifications due to reasons of going concern with respect to the whole 
universe of audit qualifications. Within our dataset, for example, they represent 
less than 15% of the total number of audit qualifications. Any analysis of the 
auditor-client relationship limited just to a very particular type of companies 
(distressed companies), not representative of the whole population of firms 
and on one very particular type of audit qualifications (for reasons of going-
concern), necessarily will suffer from a problem of generalization. When some 
of the aforementioned papers [e.g. Vanstraelen, 2000] report a negative effect of 
audit tenure on the likelihood of issuing a qualified report, we must consider that 
this finding refers only to financially distressed firms and to audit qualifications 
for reasons of going concern. Therefore, such a result cannot be generalized to 
the whole population of firms or to the whole universe of audit qualifications.
Although the function of the auditor is nowadays under discussion, its tra-
ditional role in the corporate governance scheme has been associated to verify 
the information produced by managers and therefore to be a substitute in control 
production [Simunic, 1984]. Nevertheless, when the auditor issues a qualified 
report for reasons of going concern, (s)he is not performing the information veri-
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fier role but acting as substitutes of models for bankruptcy prediction. Although, 
according to Louwers (1998), auditors’ accuracy in predicting imminent client 
insolvency does not appear to approach the levels achieved by the premier 
bankruptcy prediction models. In the same line, Asare [1990, p. 50] concludes 
that most of the studies indicate model superiority over auditors in assessing 
a client’s going-concern status. Therefore, those papers analyzing audit qual-
ity just through the exam of going-concern opinions to financially distressed 
clients, do not only ignore the main role of the external auditor in the corporate 
governance scheme as information verifiers, but also evaluate a dimension of 
the audit activity in which auditors are not particularly efficient.
The 2009 Report on the review of the annual financial reports of the regula-
tor of the Spanish financial markets (CNMV, 2009, p.14) states that the new 
standard applicable to the audit reports for the coming years establishes that the 
auditor’s opinion will not be affected by significant uncertainties, provided that 
such circumstances are properly informed in the report. Thus it implicitly recog-
nizes that predicting client insolvency is beyond the role of the external auditor.
In this paper, we examine the effects of audit tenure on the likelihood of 
qualified opinions with a sample of public Spanish companies for the period: 
2001-2009. Unlike previous research, we do not limit the analysis to audit 
qualifications for reasons of going concern, but consider all types of audit quali-
fications. In addition, our sample of companies is formed by all the nonfinancial 
firms listed in the Spanish stock market (SIBE market). Our results show that 
the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit report decreases with tenure. This 
result could be explained either by auditors’ complacency, lack of innovation, 
less rigorous audit procedures and a learned confidence in the client in long-term 
engagements [Shockley, 1982] or alternatively be the result of higher account-
ing quality when the same auditor is auditing the company for many years. 
It is important to note that the practical implications of the two situations are 
completely opposite. Nevertheless, our results reject the explanation that the 
negative association between tenure and audit qualifications is the increase in 
accounting quality in long-term audit relationships.
We make several contributions to the literature on the association between 
audit tenure and audit qualifications. Firstly and most importantly, we do not 
limit our research either to audit qualifications for reasons of going concern or 
to financially distressed companies. Thus, compared with previous research, 
our results provide a better illustration of the general effects of tenure on the 
relationship between the auditor and the audited firm, thus providing a better 
guide for policy makers when regulating the auditor-client relationship. When 
regulators approve a mandatory rotation rule, it will affect not only to financially 
distressed firms but to the whole population of firms. We, therefore, do not limit 
the analysis to the role of the auditor as an inefficient substitute of a bankruptcy 
prediction model, but include its role as an information verifier. Secondly, the 
lack of consensus about the effects of tenure on the likelihood of qualified 
reports jointly with the relevance of the issue, not only for researchers but also 
for policy makers, encourages additional research. In addition, we analyze the 
auditor tenure-qualified opinion relationship in a low litigation risk setting. Nearly 
all published studies on the auditor’s reporting decision have mostly focused 
on the U.S. Since Hopwood et al. (1994) stressed the importance of carrying 
out research on the auditor’s reporting decision in contexts different than the 
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Anglo-American setting; research accomplished in other countries should be 
particularly welcome. Finally, since we control for accounting quality, we can 
reject that the explanation of the relatively low levels of qualified opinions in 
long-term audit engagements is the increase in the quality of financial statements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we review 
the literature on the association between tenure and auditor independence. Section 
three summarizes the regulation of the auditor-client relationship in Spanish. In 
section four we define our model and describe our dataset. Results are discussed 
in sections five and six. Finally, conclusions are presented in the section seven.
2. Audit Tenure and Auditor Independence
The decision of issuing a qualified opinion may be influenced by the auditor’s 
perceived consequences in the economic trade-off between the expected cost 
of the potential loss of a client, on the one hand, and the probability of being 
exposed to third-party lawsuits and loss of reputation, on the other. The available 
evidence [e.g., Craswell, 1988; Krishnan, 1994; Lennox, 2000] indicates that 
the probability of switching the audit firm increases after a qualified report, and 
the results by Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) with a sample of U.S. companies 
support litigation risk as one of the important factors in the auditor’s opinion 
decision. In high litigation risk countries, where reputation constitutes a major 
asset for the audit firm, we can expect greater levels of auditor independence 
as defined by Levinthal and Fichman (1988): the auditor’s ability to provide an 
unbiased opinion of the quality of the financial statement. Since audit opinions 
reflect on the performance of the management that has hired the auditor, the 
ability of the auditor to render an independent opinion is threatened. The major 
threats to auditor independence are the fees perceived by the auditor for audit 
and non-audit services and length of the auditor-client relationship.
There is no consensus about the effects of tenure on auditor independence. 
While most authors agree that audit qualifications are less likely during the earlier 
years of engagement, they provided contradictory results about the relationship 
between tenure and audit qualifications after the initial period. From an orga-
nizational behaviour approach, Levinthal and Fichman (1988) found that the 
likelihood of a qualified opinion increased just after the first years of engagement 
(the so-called honeymoon period), but decreased in continuing relationships.
The results by Louwers (1998) and Carcello and Neal (2000) with samples 
of U.S. financially stressed firms did not support a significant effect of audit 
tenure on the auditors’ going-concern disclosure decision. A similar conclusion 
was reached by Vanstraelen (2002) who investigated the Belgian audit market. 
Nevertheless, Vanstraelen’s (2002) methodological approach was different from 
the former, because its sample was formed by bankrupt companies, financially 
stressed non-bankrupt companies and financially non-stressed non-bankrupt 
companies, all three categories with the same weight. Geiger and Raghunadan 
(2002) defined audit reporting failures as the inability of the auditor to issue a 
going-concern opinion to a company entering bankruptcy. They observed sig-
nificantly more audit reporting failures in the earlier years of the auditor-client 
relationship than when auditors had served these clients for longer tenures. 
However, Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) came to a different conclusion with a 
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sample of Belgian firms, their results showing that the decision of the auditor to 
issue a going-concern opinion to a company entering bankruptcy was not affected 
by tenure. They also addressed type I errors defined as issuing a going-concern 
opinion to a company that did not file bankruptcy in the following year. In this 
case, the authors observed that type I errors appeared to be lower when auditor 
tenure was longer. Without limiting the analysis to going-concern audit qualifica-
tions and using a sample of Belgian firms over the period 1992-96, Vanstraelen 
(2000) observed that long-term auditor client relationships significantly increased 
the likelihood of the auditor to issue an unqualified audit report. As Levinthal 
and Fichman (1988), she also found that auditors were more willing to issue 
unqualified reports in the first two years of engagement.
Focusing on auditor partner tenure instead of auditor firm tenure Carey and 
Simnett’s (2006) study suggested a positive relationship between tenure and 
audit failure in Australia. For long tenure observations, the authors found a lower 
propensity to issue a going-concern opinion and some evidence of just beating 
earnings benchmarks, consistent with deterioration in audit quality associated 
with long audit partner tenure.
More recently, Gul et al. (2007) and (2011), and Lim and Tan (2010) have 
attempted to test the joint effect of auditor tenure and non-audit fees on auditor 
independence and audit quality, respectively. Gul et al. (2007) found that high 
non-audit fees and short auditor tenure were associated with relatively high 
levels of accruals, thus indicating low auditor independence. Later on, Gul et 
al. (2011) acknowledged that the auditor’s reporting decision to issue a going-
concern opinion provided a more direct test of auditor independence than research 
using other indirect proxies of auditor independence, such as accruals. They 
found that auditors were willing to forgo their independence by issuing fewer 
going-concern reports when non-audit fees were high and auditor tenure was 
long. Finally, Lim and Tan (2010) addressed the triangle formed by tenure, the 
specialization of the audit firm and fees. Their results showed that firms audited 
by specialists had higher audit quality with extended auditor tenure, this relation 
being negatively moderated by auditors’ fee dependence. This conclusion was 
robust to the indicator used as a proxy of audit quality: accruals, going-concern 
audit reports and the market’s response to quarterly earnings surprises.
Surprisingly, we have only found a previous research not limiting the attention 
to going-concern opinions. Vanstraelen (2000) did find evidence that auditors 
in Belgium were less willing to qualify audit reports in general (not specifically 
going-concern qualifications) in case of long tenure. Our research shares both 
Vanstraelen’s general view of audit qualifications and the analysis of a low 
litigation risk country. Nevertheless, there are two main differences between 
both papers. Vanstraelen (2000) used two samples of firms: the first sample 
contained financially stressed non-bankrupt large companies and the second 
sample was formed by financially non-stressed non-bankrupt large companies. 
In our view, differentiation between financial and nonfinancial distressed firms 
is meaningful if the research is focused on going-concern qualifications. On the 
contrary, when the analysis includes the whole universe of audit qualifications 
(in most cases having nothing to do with near-bankrupt situations), the analysis 
through subsamples is hardly justifiable. Besides, once the financial situation 
of the audited company has been already included in the model through control 
variables, the analysis with subsamples created according to the firm’s financial 
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situation may be redundant. The second difference is that Vanstraelen (2000) 
did not control for accounting quality. The author found a negative association 
between tenure and the likelihood of audit qualifications. As we pointed out in 
the introductory sections, this finding has two possible explanations with com-
pletely opposite practical implications. Lower levels of audit qualification in 
lengthy auditor-client relationships might be explained, either by a loss of auditor 
independence or by an increase in accounting quality associated to long-term 
audit engagements. It should be emphasized, however, that from a regulator’s 
point of view, the implications of each situation are contradictory. Therefore, 
unlike Vanstraelen (2000) our sample is formed by all the companies quoted in 
the Spanish stock market (SIBE segment) and we control for accounting quality, 
measured through the firm’s levels of accruals.
3. Audit Regulation in Spain
The market for audit services in Spain started with the implementation of 
the Eighth EC Directive on Company Law. With the main goal of increasing 
the reliability of the company’s financial statements, the Spanish Audit Law 
was enforced in 1988, establishing the obligation for those companies above a 
certain size to appoint an external auditor to issue a report about the company’s 
financial statements. In 1997, a change in the legislation increased the minimum 
size for a company to be obliged to audit its financial statements, thus reduc-
ing, approximately by a 20% the number of companies subject to audit [Garcia 
Benau et al., 1999].
To ensure the independence of the auditor, the Spanish Audit Law established 
a set of criteria to regulate the auditor-client relationship. A multi-year contract 
was established with a length ranging between a minimum of three years and a 
maximum of nine years. In addition, independently of the duration of the initial 
contract, it was not allowed the reelection of the audit firm. The imposition of a 
limit in the number of years that a company could be audited by the same firm 
was equivalent to establish a mandatory auditor rotation rule. Nevertheless, both 
the limit in the maximum number of years to be audited by the same firm and 
the prohibition to renew the audit contract were abolished after a legal reform 
in 1995. After the reform, auditors would be contracted for an initial period 
ranging between a minimum of three and a maximum of nine years. However, 
after the expiration of the initial contract the company could renew the contract 
with the same auditor on a yearly basis. A consensus exists that Spanish legisla-
tion has not been particularly strict in specifying safeguards to strength auditor 
independence [Gonzalo, 1995; Paz-Ares, 1996; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004]. 
Although, from a legal point of view a company can break its audit contract 
only if a ‘just cause’ exists, since the Law does not clarify what this just cause 
may be [Gomez and Ruiz-Barbadillo, 2000], a company can, therefore, hire and 
fire its auditor without any time limitation.
Following the revised Eighth E.C. Directive, the 27 states members of the 
European Union were required to adapt national law systems. One important 
feature of this Directive was to establish audit partner rotation, although each 
State Member could voluntarily fix the maximum length of the auditor-client 
relationship. Therefore, in 2010 a new Spanish Audit Law was enforced estab-
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lishing, among other issues, the mandatory rotation of the leading audit partner 
after seven years. In addition, a minimum period of two years is required to 
be allowed to re-audit the same firm. This reform, however, will not affect our 
results, since our research period ends in 2009.
4. Methodology
4.1. Model
We have proposed a logistic model to address the effects of tenure on the 
likelihood of audit qualifications. The dependent binary variable is the auditor’s 
opinion, coded 1 in case of a qualified opinion, adverse opinion or disclaimer of 
opinion, and coded 0 in case of an unqualified opinion. Among the independent 
variables we have included the control variables suggested in the literature as 
determinants of the auditor’s reporting behavior, while our main interest is in 
the length of the auditor-client relationship (tenure).
Accordingly, model 1 has been proposed to carry out the multivariate logistic 
analysis.
Model 1:
OPINION = f (SIZE, LEVERAGE, LIQUIDITY, STOCKS, LOSSES, 
LOSSESt-1, NONBIG4, TENURE)
where:
– OPINION is a binary variable indicating whether the audit report is unqua-
lified (score 0) or ‘unclean’ (score 1).
– SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s total assets at the end of the year, as a 
proxy for size.
– LEVERAGE is the firm’s level of financial leverage calculated as total debt 
divided by total equity, both in book values.
– LIQUIDITY is a measure of the firm’s liquidity at the end of the year, calcu-
lated as the sum of its cash positions divided between its current liabilities.
– STOCKS is computed as the firm’s inventories divided by total assets at the 
end of the year.
– LOSSES is a binary variable with score 1 if the company’s net profit on year 
t is negative and 0 otherwise.
– LOSSESt-1 is the variable LOSSES one year lagged.
– NONBIG4 is a binary variable with score 1 if the company is audited by a 
non-Big 4 firm and zero otherwise.
– TENURE is the natural log of the number of years the company has been 
audited by the same firm.
Following the litigation risk framework, previous research has documented 
a positive relationship between the size of the audited firm and litigation cost 
[e.g., Lys and Watts, 1994; Shu, 2000]. Accordingly, the likelihood of audit 
qualifications should increase with size. Nevertheless, DeAngelo (1981) posed 
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that auditors’ incentives to compromise their independence was a function of 
client importance, noting that auditors could be less independent when auditing 
large clients and, therefore, less willing to issue a qualified report to large than 
to small clients. In the same vein, Palmrose (1986) highlighted the role of non-
audit services, provided by audit companies, in auditors’ independence and the 
fact that large clients purchase non-audit services more frequently than small 
clients. Available evidence has provided mixed results. Bartov et al (2000) did 
not report any significant relationship between the size of the firm and the like-
lihood of receiving a qualified opinion. On the contrary, Francis and Krishnan 
(1999) and Butler et al. (2004) supported a negative relationship between both 
variables. Finally, Reynols and Francis (2000), Bradshaw et al. (2001), and Johl 
et al. (2007) observed a positive effect of company size on the probability of a 
receiving a qualified report.
High levels of debt increase the probability of bankruptcy, and consequently 
increase litigation risk. Accordingly, we expect a positive effect of LEVERAGE 
on the likelihood of audit qualifications. Nevertheless, the available evidence 
is not conclusive. Although Francis and Krishnan (1999), Bartov et al. (2000) 
and Butler et al. (2004) concluded that financial leverage increased the likeli-
hood of a qualified audit report, Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Johl et al. (2007) 
failed to report a significant relationship between financial leverage and audit 
qualifications.
Liquidity has been found a significant determinant in predicting bankruptcy 
[e.g., Lennox, 1999]. Poor liquidity is expected to increase the likelihood of 
qualified reports since it increases the auditor’s litigation risk. In addition, firms 
with liquidity problems might be more willing to manipulate financial statements 
[e.g., Butler et al., 2004].
The auditing of the company’s inventories may represent serious difficulties, 
because they involve two audit assertions: valuation and completeness [McDaniel, 
1990]. Consequently, as posed by Simunic (1980), audit fees tend to be higher 
for those firms with relatively large amounts of inventories. In addition, audit 
errors are frequently caused by inventories [Firth, 2002], while lawsuits against 
auditors often have the origin in inventories [St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984]. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize a positive effect of inventories on the probability 
of receiving a qualified report, and therefore a positive coefficient associated 
to STOCKS.
Following previous research [e.g., Dopuch et al., 1987; Defond and 
Jiambalvo, 1993; Firth, 2002] we expect that companies experiencing losses 
will face a higher probability of receiving a qualified report. The explanation is 
quite straightforward and similar to the one proposed to justify the association 
between liquidity and audit qualifications. Firms with losses will more likely 
incur in earnings management activities. In addition, from the auditor’s point 
of view, since litigation risk is higher for those firms with losses, so it should 
be the probability of audit qualifications.
Finally, recent studies have highlighted the role played by career concerns 
of audit firms in their auditing effort and independence [see for instance, 
Portilla 2009]. Accordingly, Big 4 auditors will have incentives to provide 
higher quality audits consistent with their brand name reputation, and thus are 
expected to show a higher propensity to issue qualified reports [e.g., Carey 
and Simnett, 2006].
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4.2. Sample and dataset
Our sample is formed by all the companies quoted in the Spanish Stock 
Exchange (SIBE market) during the research period: 2001-2009. Data about 
the independent variables in the model has been provided by Thomson Reuters 
Knowledge. On the other hand, information about the nature of the audit report 
has been obtained from the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). 
Since control variables in our model include liquidity and debt ratios, banks and 
financial companies have been removed from the sample. We have finally worked 
with 110 companies. While 91 of these companies have been quoted in the Spanish 
market during the whole research period, the remaining 19 companies joined the 
stock market after the year 2001. Our data source provides information only for 
quoted companies, thus for 19 companies in our dataset we do not have information 
for the whole research period. As a result, our dataset was initially formed by 937 
firm-year observations. Nevertheless, in 56 firm-year observations information 
about all the variables included in the analysis was not available. Consequently, 
our dataset has been finally formed by 881 firm-year observations.
Following the Spanish law, the audit report should include the opinion of the 
auditor which can be: unqualified, qualified, unfavorable or disclaimer of opinion. 
Nevertheless, audit reports either with unfavorable or disclaimer of opinion are 
in practice very unusual, at least for quoted companies. In this research, we have 
examined 937 audit reports, 803 of them with an unqualified opinion, and 134 
with a qualified opinion. None of them, however, had either an unfavorable or 
disclaimer of opinion. Therefore, qualified audit reports represent the 14% of the 
total reports examined.
In Table 1 we show the 937 audit reports classified by year and type of auditor 
opinion (unqualified or qualified).
TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF AUDIT REPORTS BY YEAR  
AND AUDITOR OPINION
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Unqualified 71 77 83 94 97 101 99 90 91
Qualified 20 18 14 13 10 9 11 20 19
Total 91 95 97 107 107 110 110 110 110
As shown by Table 1, the number of firms with qualified audit reports de-
creases systematically during the subperiod 2001-2006, and increases after the 
year 2006, being particularly meaningful the situation in 2008, at the beginning 
of the international financial crisis, showing an almost 100% increase in the 
number of firms with qualified reports. The number of qualified reports expressed 
in percentage of total reports ranges between a maximum of 22% the year 2001 
and a minimum of 8% the year 2006.
Graph 1 shows the histogram of audit tenure in our dataset. As it can be 
seen the distribution is far from normal. Our sample is characterized by a high 
number of firms with relatively short audit tenures.
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Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics about the independent variables 
used in the multivariate logistic regression. The statistics for variable LEVERAGE 
indicate that for the companies in our sample, on mean terms, the amount of 
debt is four times the amount of equity. The mean value of 0.17 for variable 
LOSSES shows that companies with negative net income accounts for the 17% 
of our dataset. The table also shows a dramatic level of concentration of the 
Spanish audit market by Big 4 firms, since they audit more of the 90 percent of 
the quoted companies. Regarding our main variable of interest, TENURE, the 
mean value of 1.92, corresponds to an average duration of almost seven years 
in the auditor-client relationship.
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean Median St. Dev.
SIZE 2.92 2.83  0.84
LEVERAGE 4.03 1.94 30.65
LIQUIDITY 0.19 0.86  0.40
STOCKS 0.16 0.11  0.17
LOSSES 0.17 0.00  0.38
LOSSESt-1 0.13 0.00  0.33
NONBIG4 0.09 0.00  0.28
TENURE 1.92 2.08  0.86
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Table 3 shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients, together with significance 
levels, for the independent variables used in the multivariate logistic regression. 
Interestingly, the positive and significant correlation between TENURE and 
SIZE shows that big companies tend to have lengthy relations with the audit 
firm. Besides, the negative and significant correlation between TENURE and 
LOSSES suggests that profitable firms tend to show relatively long-term relation-
ships with the audit firm. In the same line, Big 4 firms tend to show relatively 
longer engagements compared with non-Big 4 firms Since correlation coeffi-
cients between independent variables are rather low (the maximum correlation 
coefficient, in absolute values, is 0.55), multicollinearity will hardly affect our 
estimation results. Nevertheless, we have calculated the variance inflation factors 
(VIF), in order to rule out the negative potential effects of multicollinearity in 
our estimation results. As expected VIF show very low values (the maximum 
value is 2.58 for variable TENURE), thus indicating that multicollinearity will 
not affect our results.
5. Results
Before the estimation of the multivariate logistic regression, we have performed 
a univariate analysis of differences of means for the subsamples of firms with 
qualified and with unqualified audit reports. As expected, the Shapiro-Wilk test 
reveals that the hypothesis of normality is rejected for all independent variables, 
thus we have performed the Mann-Whitney test of differences of medians in order 
to assess about the statistical significance of these differences. Median values of 
the independent variables for the two subsamples, jointly with the results of the 
Mann-Whitney test for the continuous variables and the Chi-Square test for the 
dichotomous variables LOSSES, LOSSESt-1 and NONBIG4 are shown in Table 4. 
As expected, firms with qualified audit reports are relatively small, show high 
levels of financial leverage and stocks and are relatively less profitable com-
pared with firms with unqualified audit reports. In addition, firms with qualified 
reports are engaged in relatively short term engagements with the audit firm. 
With the exceptions of LEVERAGE, STOCKS and NONBIG4, the differences 
between firms with qualified and unqualified reports are statistically significant 
at the usual levels. Therefore, focusing the attention on audit tenure, the results 
provided by the univariate analysis suggest a negative effect of tenure on the 
likelihood of audit qualifications.
The analysis of the joint effect of audit tenure and the proposed control 
variables on the likelihood of audit qualifications has been performed through 
a multivariate logistic regression. Significance tests have been performed with 
robust standard errors. It should be noted that as we have included the lagged 
variable LOSSESt-1 among the regressors, we have lost all the observations 
corresponding to year 2001. The post-estimation analyses carried out after a 
first estimation of the model has revealed four influential observations (with 
Pregibon dbeta higher than 0.2). The results provided by Table 5 correspond to 
the re-estimation of the model without these influential observations. Estimation 
results and some indicators of the model’s goodness of fit are shown in Table 5. 
The model’s Chi-square value is statistically significant at the usual levels, thus 
indicating that the observations are well fitted by the proposed model. Two 
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other indicators of the goodness of fit are the pseudo R2 and the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow’s test. The pseudo R2 provides a measure of the proportion (in terms 
of the log likelihood) of the variance explained by the model. Our model explains 
the 22% of the total variance. The idea behind the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s 
goodness-of-fit test is that predicted and observed frequencies should match 
closely. In our case, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (not provided) supports that 
there are not significantly differences between predicted frequency and observed 
frequency. Finally, our proposed model correctly classifies 88% of the cases.
When developing a logistic regression model, we implicitly assume that the 
logit of the outcome variable is a linear combination of the independent vari-
ables. This involves, firstly the assumption that the logit function is the correct 
function to use; and secondly that we have included all the relevant variables, 
that we have not included any variables that should not be in the model and that 
the logit function is a linear combination of the predictors. As the implications 
of misspecification of the link function are usually not too severe, we are more 
concerned with whether our model has all the relevant predictors and if the linear 
combination of them is sufficient. Therefore, after the logistic regression, we 
have performed a linktest. The rational for this test is that if the model is prop-
erly specified, we should not be able to find any additional predictors that are 
statistically significant. The results of the linktest (not provided) do not suggest 
any specification problems associated to our proposed model.
As shown by Table 5, the results of the multivariate analysis strongly support 
our previous findings from the univariate approach. The only difference between 
both approaches refers to variables LEVERAGE and NONBIG4. While none of 
these variables show statistically significant results in the univariate analysis, 
in both cases, the results of the multivariate analysis indicate significance in 
the predicted direction.
With the only exception of STOCKS, all the independent variables have a 
significant effect on the probability of receiving a qualified report. It should 
be noted that in all cases, significance is reported in the predicted direction. 
The likelihood of audit qualifications decreases with the size of the company 
TABLE 4
MEDIAN VALUES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ACCORDING  
WITH AUDITOR OPINION. FOR QUALITATIVE VARIABLES,  
MEAN VALUES ARE PROVIDED
Qualified Unqualified Significance Test
SIZE 2.74 2.93 2.88**
LEVERAGE 11.68 2.73 –1.63
LIQUIDITY 0.08 0.21 5.77**
STOCKS 0.20 0.15 –1.31
LOSSES 0.36 0.14 39.84**
LOSSESt–1 0.33 0.10 49.45**
NONBIG4 0.10 0.09 0.17
TENURE 1.57 1.98 4.94**
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01.
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(P-value < 0.01). This result suggests that the economic incentives of the auditor 
with the audited company more than offset the potential increased in litigation 
costs faced with large clients. Since Spain is a low litigation risk country, this 
result is far from surprising. As expected, the higher the firm’s financial lever-
age, the higher the likelihood of audit qualifications. The associated coefficient 
to LEVERAGE is positive and statistically significant (P-value < 0.01). Due to 
the difficulties usually involving the valuation of stocks, we had hypothesized 
a positive effect of the level of stocks on the likelihood of audit qualifications. 
However, the associated coefficient to variable STOCKS is not statistically sig-
nificant at the usual levels. As expected, companies suffering or having suffered 
losses have a higher probability of receiving a qualified audit report compared 
with profitable firms. Variables LOSSES and LOSSESt-1 present positive and 
statistically significant associated coefficients (P-value < 0.01). As hypothesized, 
the likelihood of qualified reports is lower for companies enjoying high levels of 
liquidity. The coefficient associated to LIQUIDITY is negative and statistically 
significant (P-value < 0.01). We had predicted a negative coefficient associated 
to variable NONBIG4, as Big 4 firms have relatively stronger incentives to issue 
qualified opinions. Our results support this hypothesis, since being audited by 
a Big 4 firm increases the likelihood of audit qualifications (P-value < 0.01).
As for the effects of auditor tenure on the likelihood of audit qualification, 
our results show that qualified opinions are less likely in lengthy auditor-client 
relationships. The coefficient associated to variable TENURE is negative and 
statistically significant (P-value < 0.01).
Following the discussion carried out in section 2, neither theoretical models 
nor the available empirical evidence have led to a unanimous effect of audit 
tenure on the probability of qualified reports. Auditor independence might be 
impaired in long-term auditor-client relationships. Similarly to Vanstraelen 
(2000), Carey and Simnett (2006) and Gul et al. (2011), our results show a 
TABLE 5
ESTIMATES OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION
Variable Expected sign Coefficient Z-value
SIZE – –0.732 –2.87**
LEVERAGE + 0.073 2.71**
LIQUIDITY – –6.061 –3.59**
STOCKS + –0.594 –0.72
LOSSES + 1.084 3.59**
LOSSESt–1 + 0.872 2.72**
NONBIG4 – –1.454 –2.78**





% correctly predicted: 87.73
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01.
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negative effect of tenure on the likelihood of audit qualifications. While this 
result is usually interpreted as indicative of a loss of independence associated to 
longer tenures, it could also be explained according to principal‐agent models 
based on implicit incentives or career concerns. According to this alternative 
view, agents with lesser career concerns (perhaps also those holding lengthy 
contracts) have lower reputational incentives to exert effort and meet their duties 
with diligence [Portilla, 2009].
As we discussed in the introductory section, it should be emphasized that 
our approach departs to the one usually adopted in previous research, includ-
ing the aforementioned papers. The standard approach restrains the analysis 
to financially distressed companies and to audit qualifications for reasons of 
going concern. Nevertheless, financially distressed firms represent just a small 
share of the total population of firms, and the same situation occurs regarding 
audit qualifications for reasons of going concern regarding the total number of 
audit qualifications. In addition, we should also consider that the main role of 
the external auditor is not to predict a company’s bankruptcy, but to verify that 
the company’s financial statements show its current situation. Any analysis 
of the auditor-client relationship limited just to a very particular type of com-
panies (distressed companies), not representative of the whole population of 
firms and focused on one particular type of audit qualifications (for reasons of 
going-concern), necessarily presents a problem of lack of generalization. When 
Gul et al. (2011) reported a negative effect of audit tenure on the likelihood of 
issuing a qualified report, it should be emphasized that this finding refers only 
to financially distressed firms and to audit qualifications for reasons of going 
concern. This result cannot be generalized either to the whole population of 
firms or to the whole universe of audit qualifications. The problem of lack of 
generalization is particularly meaningful when this evidence is used to support 
regulations on mandatory rotation that will affect the whole population of firms. 
Conversely, since we include all types of audit qualifications and firms in the 
analysis, our results do not suffer from lack of generalization problems and 
can therefore provide a better guide to policy-makers to establish regulations 
regarding the rotation of auditors.
We have performed various analyses to check the robustness of our results. 
First, a problem could arise from a potential double causality between OPINION 
and TENURE, as we cannot rule out that the class of audit opinion (favorable 
or adverse) affects the client firm’s decision about renewing or not its relation-
ship with the audit firm, and thereby, the length of the engagement. Therefore, 
we have included a sensitivity analysis to control for the potential problems of 
endogeneity in our data. We have modeled audit firm tenure as shown by the 
following model:
AUDSWITCH = f (SIZE, LOSSESt-1, NONBIG4, OPINIONt-1)
Where AUDSWITCH is defined as 1 if the company has changed its auditor 
in year t, and 0 otherwise. Our main interest is with the statistical significance 
of variable OPINIONt-1, and the selection of control variables is based on prior 
research. The estimation of the model has been performed with robust standard 
errors. Results, reported in Table 6, show that the coefficient associated to 
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OPINIONt-1 is nonsignificant. We, therefore, rule out that endogeneity problems 
can affect our results.
TABLE 6

















* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01.
We have also checked for the fact that the relationship between tenure and 
the likelihood of audit qualifications could be nonmonotonic, due to a trade-
off between the auditors learning curve versus independence. Thus, we have 
re-estimated our prosed model including the square of TENURE (SQTENURE) 
as an additional explanatory variable. Results (not reported) show that the coef-
ficient associated to SQTENURE is nonsignificant. Similarly, we have performed 
a reestimation of the model including the square of SIZE (SQSIZE) as an ad-
ditional explanatory variable. As in the previous case, the new variable has not a 
significant effect on the likelihood of audit qualifications (results not reported).
6. Some Additional Results
In this section we focus on two relevant issues for this research: the so-called 
honeymoon period in the auditor-client relationship and the robustness of our 
results to the inclusion of accounting quality in the analysis.
6.1. Does a “honeymoon period” exist in the Spanish market?
Levinthal and Fichman (1988) and Vanstraelen (2002) observed that the 
likelihood of qualified opinions increased just after the first years of engagement. 
The former authors named this effect a honeymoon period in the auditor-client 
relationship. The suggested explanation is that a qualified opinion is an indica-
tor of conflict within the auditor-client relationship and that shortly after the 
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initiation of an auditor-client relationship, both auditors and clients attempt to 
avoid such conflicts.
To test the existence of a honeymoon effect in the Spanish market we have 
estimated model 2.
Model 2:
OPINION = f (SIZE, LEVERAGE, LIQUIDITY, STOCKS, LOSSES, 
LOSSESt-1, NONBIG4, TENURE, HONEYMOON)
This model is similar to model 1 but we have included HONEYMOON, a 
dichotomous variable with the score 1 the first and second year of the auditor-
client relationship and 0 otherwise. If a honeymoon effect exists in the Spanish 
audit market, the associated coefficient to variable HONEYMOON should 
be negative and statistically significant. Results of the estimation of model 2 
are shown in Table 7. The coefficient associated to HONEYMOON, although 
negative, it is not statistically significant at the usual levels, thus not support-
ing a honeymoon effect in the Spanish market. All other results remain largely 
unchanged from those shown in Table 5.
TABLE 7
ESTIMATES OF MODEL 2
Variable Expected sign Coefficient Z-value
SIZE – –0.724 –2.80**
LEVERAGE + 0.072 2.62**
LIQUIDITY – –6.129 –3.84**
STOCKS + –0.630 –0.77
LOSSES + 1.092 3.62**
LOSSESt–1 + 0.873 2.70**
NONBIG4 – –1.476 –2.80**
TENURE – –0.754 –2.63**





% correctly predicted: 88.36
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01.
6.2. Controlling for accounting quality
From the estimation of model 1 we have concluded that the likelihood of 
audit qualifications decreases with tenure. This finding is traditionally explained 
in terms of a loss of auditor independence in long-term audit engagements. 
Following Shockley’s (1982) view: complacency, lack of innovation, less rig-
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orous audit procedures and a learned confidence in the client may arise after 
long association with the client. The implications for policy makers are thus 
quite straightforward: in order to preserve auditor independence, rotation of the 
audit firm should be mandatory. Nevertheless, there is an alternative explanation 
for the reported negative relationship between tenure and audit qualifications. 
DeAngelo (1981) defined audit quality as the joint probability that an auditor 
will both detect and report material misstatements. Accordingly, audit quality 
is a function of the ability of the auditor to detect material misstatements (ex-
pertise) and report the detected misstatements (independence). As the ability to 
detect misstatements is higher when the auditor has a better knowledge of the 
client, and given that this knowledge increases with tenure, it could be argued 
that the reported negative effect of tenure on audit qualifications is not the 
result of a decline in auditor independence but it is explained by the increase in 
accounting quality achieved as a consequence of lengthy audit engagements. 
If the latter interpretation prevails, the implications for policy makers will be 
now completely different: mandatory rotation should be abolished because it 
impoverishes the quality of accounting.
From the review of an extensive prior literature, we conclude that accounting 
accruals measures are plausible descriptors of audit quality. Numerous researchers 
have analyzed the association between various measures of accruals as proxies 
of accounting quality and auditor litigation [Heninger, 2001], auditor changes 
[DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998] and qualified opinions [Bartov et al., 2000]. 
Since Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986), many studies have used total accruals 
as a measure of management discretion. High levels of accruals have been as-
sociated to high levels of earnings management and therefore to poor accounting 
quality. In the investigation of the relationship between accounting quality and 
audit qualifications, Francis and Krishnan (1999) and Bradshaw et al. (2001) 
use the firm’s total accruals as the proxy of accounting quality. Similarly, Myers 
et al.’s (2003) research about the effects of audit tenure on accounting quality 
uses total accruals as an indicator of the quality of accounting.
We have computed the firm’s total accruals (ACCRUALS) as the difference 
between operating income minus cash flows from operations, scaled by lagged 
total assets. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient between ACCRUALS and 
TENURE is –0.125 and it is statistically significant (P-value < 0.01), thus sug-
gesting that accounting quality increases with audit tenure. We have included 
the new variable ACCRUALS in model 1 to obtain model 3.
Model 3:
OPINION = f (SIZE, LEVERAGE, LIQUIDITY, STOCKS, LOSSES, 
LOSSESt-1, NONBIG4, TENURE, ACCRUALS)
If the negative relationship between audit tenure and the likelihood of qualified 
reports is because accounting quality increases with tenure, once we introduce 
ACCRUALS in the model and thus control for audit quality, tenure should not 
significantly affect the likelihood of audit qualifications. On the contrary, if 
the effect of tenure remains negative and significant after controlling for ac-
counting quality, we will conclude that the negative relationship between audit 
tenure and qualified opinions cannot be explained by an increase in accounting 
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quality, and thus, the explanation of a loss of independence in long-term audit 
engagements prevails.
Table 8 shows the estimates of model 3. After the removal of those observa-
tions without data for the new variable ACRRUALS, the sample size drops to 600 
firm-year observations. As a proof of the robustness of our models, results do not 
change much with this sample compared with our initial sample. The model’s 
pseudo R2 increases from 22% to 24% and the coefficients and significance levels 
for the control variables remain unchanged in most cases. The coefficient associ-
ated to TENURE remains negative and statistically significant (P-value < 0.05) 
while the coefficient of ACCRUALS is negative but nonsignificant. This result 
indicates that our main previous finding that the likelihood of audit qualifications 
decreases with tenure is robust to the inclusion of accounting quality into the 
model. Thus, we rule out that the explanation of the relatively lower probability 
of audit qualifications associated to long-term audit engagements is the increase 
in accounting quality. Therefore, the most plausible alternative explanation is 
that auditor independence is impaired in lengthy auditor-client relationships.
TABLE 8
ESTIMATES OF MODEL 3
Variable Expected sign Coefficient Z-value
SIZE – –0.629 –1.91
LEVERAGE + 0.089 2.92**
LIQUIDITY – –6.886 –3.45**
STOCKS + 0.065 0.06
LOSSES + 1.331 3.88**
LOSSESt–1 + 0.352 0.76
NONBIG4 – –1.008 –2.05*
TENURE – –0.461 –2.24*





% correctly predicted: 90.00
* P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01.
7. Conclusions
External auditors perform a major role in the corporate governance scheme 
guaranteeing the quality of accounting. To perform this function adequately they 
must be completely independent of their clients. As lengthy audit engagements 
constitute a potential threat for auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and numerous national corporate governance codes have included measures to 
favour audit rotation. Previous research does not fully agree about the effects of 
Audit tenure and audit… / Josep García Blandón, Josep Maria Argilés Bosch 153
tenure on audit quality. In addition, it has been focused on financial distressed 
firms and on audit qualifications for reasons of going concern. However, the 
main role of the external auditor is not to warn about the likely insolvency of 
the firm but to verify that financial statements show the current situation of the 
firm. Therefore, researchers addressing the effects of tenure on audit quality 
only through the analysis of qualified opinions for reasons of going concern are 
missing the main role of the external auditor, which is not to predict imminent 
insolvency but to verify the company’s financial statements. In addition, as their 
results have been obtained with samples of financially distressed firms, they 
cannot be generalized to the whole universe of firms. Therefore, such evidence 
will have only a limited usefulness in the discussion about the establishing of 
a mandatory audit rotation rule.
Our results reveal that audit qualifications are less likely in lengthy auditor-
client relationships. Nevertheless, since one possible explanation of the lower 
probability of receiving a qualified report is that accounting quality is higher 
in lengthy audit engagements, we have reestimated our model controlling for 
accounting quality. Our main result is robust to the inclusion of accounting qual-
ity, and thus we have finally concluded that long-term audit engagements seem 
to impair auditor independence. Therefore, the rotation of the audit firm could 
favor auditor independence and audit quality. The fact that we have measured 
accounting quality only through the firm’s total accruals constitutes a limitation 
of our research. It would be interesting, however, to test the robustness of this 
result to more sophisticated measures of accounting quality. A second limita-
tion of this research, because of data availability, is that we have not controlled 
for the fact that very often, auditors provide both audit and non-audit services 
to the same clients. The lack of independence of external auditors might come 
from the conflict of interests emerged when an audit firm provides a pool of 
services to the client.
Finally, it is important to stress that this research has examined the rotation 
of the audit firm. Nevertheless, with just a few exceptions, mandatory auditor 
rotation rules have been established at a partner level. Our results indicate that 
the rotation of the lead partner auditor could not adequately guarantee auditor 
independence.
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